Influence of cognitive dissonance on Maritime Industry Safety Culture, Marine Accidents & Casualty, Human Factor and Safety Engineering
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.69980/mwqydm26Keywords:
Maritime safety, Human factors, Cognitive behaviour, Safety culture, Marine accidents, Safety engineering, Human–system interactionAbstract
Even when all sorts of improvements and innovations are made regarding maritime technology and regulation, marine accidents and marine victims remain a thorn in the flesh, and human related factors are often pointed out as the major causes. It is therefore necessary to have an insight on the interplay between cognitive behaviour and organizational conditions and system design, as well as determine the impact of these factors on safety outcomes. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of cognitive and human-related variables on the maritime safety culture, marine accidents and victims, and safety engineering practice by conducting a qualitative review on the secondary data. The study takes the form of a narrative review because the study will utilize peer-reviewed journal articles, analytical reviews, and research books that focus on maritime safety and safety science. The major academic databases were searched and identified using relevant literature and analysed through a thematic and interpretative approach. The review concentrated on evidence synthesis of the evidence that touches on cognitive strain, human error, psychosocial pressures, safety culture, and human-system interaction in maritime operations. The results have shown that the maritime accidents are not often related to isolated human errors, but rather manifested as cumulative cognitive load, behavioural adjustment, and organizational circumstances of normalization of unsafe practices. Cognitive vulnerabilities and risk of accidents were found to be encouraged by weak safety cultures, inadequate reporting systems, and production-oriented priorities. In addition, new developments in automation and safety engineering have changed the exposure of human risks through the increased cognitive workload and new challenges of human-system interaction. The research also outlines the drawbacks of mainly proactive safety management strategies that are based on post-incidence examination. This study is relevant to the study of maritime safety because it presents a holistic view where cognitive behaviour, safety culture of the organization, and the engineering of safety are interlinked. The results assume the necessity of proactive, systems-based, and human-centered safety measures to improve the performance of maritime safety.
References
1.Bergström, J., Van Winsen, R., & Henriqson, E. (2015). On the rationale of resilience in the domain of safety: A literature review. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 141, 131–141. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2015.03.008
2.Chowdhury, M. N., Shafi, S., Mohd Arzaman, A. F., Kadhim, K. A., Salamun, H., Abdul Kadir, F. K., & Jusoh, M. H. (2024). Navigating human factors in maritime safety: A review of risks and improvements in engine rooms of ocean-going vessels. International Journal of Safety & Security Engineering, 14(1), 1–14. https://doi.org/10.18280/ijsse.140101
3.Dekker, S. (2017). The field guide to understanding human error. CRC Press.
4.Derdowski, L. A., & Mathisen, G. E. (2023). Psychosocial factors and safety in high-risk industries: A systematic literature review. Safety Science, 157, 105948. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2022.105948
5.Dominguez-Péry, C., Vuddaraju, L. N. R., Corbett-Etchevers, I., & Tassabehji, R. (2021). Reducing maritime accidents in ships by tackling human error: A bibliometric review and research agenda. Journal of Shipping and Trade, 6(1), 20. https://doi.org/10.1186/s41072-021-00093-1
6.Galieriková, A. (2019). The human factor and maritime safety. Transportation Research Procedia, 40, 1319–1326. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trpro.2019.07.183
7.Hollnagel, E. (2017). Safety-II in practice: Developing the resilience potentials. Routledge.
8.Kasyk, L. (2024). Human factors in navigational accidents demand focus on safety culture. Applied Sciences, 14(2), Article 875. https://doi.org/10.3390/app14020875
9.Leveson, N. G. (2016). Engineering a safer world: Systems thinking applied to safety. MIT Press.
10.Ma, X. F., Shi, G. Y., & Liu, Z. J. (2023). Unraveling the usage characteristics of human element, human factor, and human error in maritime safety. Applied Sciences, 13(5), 2850. https://doi.org/10.3390/app13052850
11.Maternová, A., Materna, M., Dávid, A., Török, A., & Švábová, L. (2023). Human error analysis and fatality prediction in maritime accidents. Journal of Marine Science and Engineering, 11(12), 2287. https://doi.org/10.3390/jmse11122287
12.Newnam, S., & Oxley, J. (2016). A program in safety management for the occupational driver: Conceptual development and implementation case study. Safety Science, 84, 238–244. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2015.12.003
13.Psarros, G., Skjong, R., & Eide, M. S. (2010). Under-reporting of maritime accidents. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 42(2), 619–625. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2009.10.008
14.Reason, J. (2016). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Routledge.
15.Soares, C. G., & Santos, T. A. (Eds.). (2024). Advances in maritime technology and engineering. CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group.
16.Wróbel, K., Gil, M., Krata, P., Olszewski, K., & Montewka, J. (2023). On the use of leading safety indicators in maritime and their feasibility for maritime autonomous surface ships. Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part O: Journal of Risk and Reliability, 237(2), 314–331. https://doi.org/10.1177/1748006X221128742
17.Yang, H., Ozbay, K., & Xie, K. (2014). Assessing the risk of secondary crashes on highways. Journal of Safety Research, 49, 143–e1. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsr.2014.02.004
